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OPINION*** 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Mark Marcoccia was arrested for conspiring to distribute a controlled substance 
analogue. He pleaded guilty and received a sentencing enhancement for being a career 
offender under Section 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Arguing that 
the District Court erred by designating him a career offender and not substantially 
departing downward, he appeals the court imposed sentence and final judgment. For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm.1 
                                              
*** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
1 At the outset, we wish to thank the Federal Public Defender for its 
responsiveness to the Court’s request for a submission of amicus briefing in this case. 
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I. 
 For two years, Appellant Mark Marcoccia conspired with Justin Johnson to 
distribute a controlled substance analogue known as “bath salts,” and to conceal and 
spend the proceeds from the sale of that illegal substance. Johnson managed the 
distribution of the drugs—he identified a steady source of supply for bath salts and 
generated revenue from internet sales of the substance. Marcoccia managed the 
finances—he provided cash to purchase additional quantities of bath salts, and concealed 
the source of the drug revenue by making structured bank deposits and several large 
purchases.  
On December 1, 2015, Marcoccia was charged with one count of conspiracy to 
distribute controlled substances under 21 U.S.C. § 846. He pleaded guilty and the United 
States’ Attorney’s Office stipulated that his base offense level was fourteen with a two-
point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. It noted, however, that none of these 
stipulations were binding on the United States Probation Office.  
On March 23, 2016, the Probation Office issued its presentence investigation 
report (“PSR”). The PSR designated Marcoccia as a career offender based on two prior 
felony convictions. The first conviction was a state felony conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine and the second conviction was a federal felony conviction for 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute in excess of 50 grams of 
methamphetamine. In the state case, he was charged in 2003 and sentenced on April 8, 
2004. In the federal case, he was charged in 2005 and sentenced on May 16, 2007.  
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As a result of the career offender enhancement, Marcoccia’s sentencing range 
increased dramatically.2 Accordingly, he objected to the career offender status, claiming 
that it should not apply to him and requested either a downward variance or a downward 
departure. On June 1, 2016, the District Court considered Maroccia’s arguments at his 
sentencing hearing. First, it concluded that the career offender enhancement applied to 
Marcoccia under the plain text of the guidelines. Second, it stated that the guidelines 
range was too high, that the appropriate way to reduce Marcoccia’s sentence was through 
a variance, and that there were no motions for departure. Third, it agreed that a variance 
was warranted for several reasons, including that the sentencing disparity between 
Marcoccia and his co-conspirator was too high. Ultimately, the District Court granted a 
substantial variance and entered judgment, imposing a sentence of 96 months’ 
imprisonment followed by four years’ supervised release. This appeal followed.  
II. 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231, and this Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We “exercise plenary review over a district court’s interpretation of 
the Guidelines” and “review factual findings relevant to the Guidelines for clear error.” 
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). We review a District 
                                              
2 Without it, his offense level was twelve and his criminal history category was 
five, resulting in a guideline range of 27-33 months. With it, his offense level was twenty 
nine and his criminal history category was six, resulting in a guideline range of 151-188 
months. 
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Court’s sentencing decisions for both “procedural and substantive reasonableness” 
applying an “abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 
(3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
III. 
On appeal, Marcoccia raises three primary issues. First, he argues that the District 
Court erred in designating him as a career offender. Second, he argues that the District 
Court erred in not giving him a proper downward departure. Third, he argues that his 
sentence was not substantively reasonable. We consider each argument, in turn, and will 
affirm for the reasons stated below. 
A. 
Under Section 4B1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual “[a] 
defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the 
time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of 
conviction is a felony that is . . . a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has 
at least two prior felony convictions of . . . a controlled substance offense.” To determine 
whether to treat prior convictions as separate, the Guidelines state:  
Prior sentences always are counted separately if the sentences were imposed for 
offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested 
for the first offense prior to committing the second offense). If there is no 
intervening arrest, prior sentences are counted separately unless (A) the sentences 
resulted from offenses contained in the same charging instrument; or (B) the 
sentences were imposed on the same day. 
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United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 4A1.2(a)(2). On appeal, 
Marcoccia argues that the District Court improperly applied this enhancement because 
his two prior felonies should be treated as one conviction and because he is not the 
recidivist criminal that the enhancement was meant to target. 
We disagree. Whether or not there was an intervening arrest in this case,3 and 
whether or not Marcoccia was the recidivist felon that the career offender guideline was 
meant to target, because his state and federal felonies were sentenced on different days 
and charged in different instruments, the unambiguous text of the guidelines precludes 
his argument that his two prior felonies should be treated as one conviction. See U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.2(a)(2); United States v. Brown, 578 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 2009) (“When 
construing the Guidelines, we look first to the plain language, and where that is 
unambiguous we need look no further.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Jones, 698 
F.3d 1048, 1050-51 (8th Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument that two prior convictions 
prosecuted in different jurisdictions and sentenced on different days should be considered 
“a single sentence because the offenses were ‘inextricably intertwined’” as “[s]uch an 
approach would ignore the clear instruction from section 4A1.2(a)(2).”). Accordingly, 
because Marcoccia has two prior felony convictions, and because Marcoccia does not 
                                              
3 As relevant to this question, the record shows that Marcoccia’s prior federal case 
lists a different, and much later, arrest date for the federal felony than the state felony, 
while also indicating that he was released and then re-arrested twice after his initial arrest 
for the state felony. Since the federal conspiracy charge encompassed a time period that 
ended after his initial state arrest, as we noted at oral argument, Marcoccia may also 
qualify as a career offender on the basis that his “sentences were imposed for offenses 
that were separated by an intervening arrest.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a). 
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dispute that he meets the other requirements of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), the District Court 
properly concluded that he qualifies for the career offender enhancement under the plain 
text of the guidelines.  
B. 
 “After Booker, a district court must undertake a three-step process in imposing a 
sentence: (1) calculate the applicable Guidelines range, (2) formally rule on any departure 
motions, and (3) exercise its discretion in applying the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a).” United States v. Grier, 585 F.3d 138, 141-42 (3d Cir. 2009). Consequently, 
after the District Court calculates the applicable guidelines range, it “must formally rule 
on the motions of both parties and state on the record whether [it is] granting a departure 
and how that departure affects the Guidelines calculation.” United States v. Lofink, 564 
F.3d 232, 237-38 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d 
Cir. 2006). On appeal, Marcoccia argues that the District Court procedurally erred by 
failing to perform this second step and not considering the appropriateness of downward 
departures. 
We disagree. First, this Court may “infer . . . from the District Court’s actions” in 
this case that “[it] did use its discretion to deny the request for a downward departure, 
choosing instead to grant a . . . variance.” United States v. Handerhan, 739 F.3d 114, 
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121-22 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).4 Under our prior cases, we lack 
jurisdiction to review that discretionary decision. See Grier, 585 F.3d at 141 (“We cannot 
. . . review a district court’s refusal to grant a downward departure . . . unless the record 
reflects that the district court was not aware of or did not understand its discretion to 
make such a departure.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Jackson, 
467 F.3d 834, 839 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We . . . have no authority to review discretionary 
denials of departure motions in calculating sentencing ranges.”).  
Second, the District Court went on to state that there were “no motions for 
departure,” and, when it made that statement, Marcoccia did not object, limiting our 
review for plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b).5 Under plain error 
review, Marcoccia must show that the District Court committed a “clear or obvious” error 
that “affected the appellant’s substantial rights” by raising “a reasonable probability that 
the error affected the outcome of the proceedings.”  United States v. Calabretta, 831 F.3d 
128, 132 (3d Cir. 2016). If he meets that test, he must then show that the error “seriously 
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings” before we 
may exercise our discretion to remedy it. Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
725, 736 (1993)).  
                                              
4 Indeed, it expressly noted: “I do agree . . . that the range calculated by the 
guideline is too high . . .  But I think the appropriate way to deal with that is through a 
variance. If I were to deal with it through a departure, I would be limited to a departure of 
only one criminal history category pursuant to 4A1.3(b)(3)(A).” J.A. 87.  
5 In fact, far from objecting, Marcoccia’s counsel went on to expressly state: “I 
think the solution is exactly what the Court hinted at the beginning; the solution is a 
variance.” J.A. 98. 
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Here, we are satisfied that even if the Court engaged in procedural error by stating 
that there were no requests for downward departures, that error was harmless and does 
not require remand for resentencing. Because the District Court’s stated intention was to 
use its discretion to lower Marcoccia’s sentence through a downward variance rather than 
a downward departure, we cannot say the District Court’s failure to note that Marcoccia 
requested departures “affect[ed] the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed” as 
is required for a non-constitutional error to require remand for resentencing.  Brown, 578 
F.3d at 226 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[g]iven the district court’s 
reliance on the § 3553(a) factors and the substantial discrepancy between the sentence 
imposed and the calculated Guidelines range,” United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 
388 (3d Cir. 2013), we believe this is one of those rare cases where “a district court may 
choose to disregard the Guidelines as too severe in such a way that we can be certain that 
the miscalculation had no effect on the sentence imposed.” United States v. Langford, 
516 F.3d 205, 218 (3d Cir. 2008).  
         C.  
Finally, Marcoccia argues that his sentence was not substantively reasonable. For 
substantive reasonableness, we “give[] district courts broad latitude in sentencing,” 
United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008),6 and the pertinent inquiry 
“is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the 
                                              
6 See also United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) (“That we 
may ourselves have imposed a sentence different from that of the district court, based on 
our own de novo assessment of the evidence, is no basis to overturn the judgment.”). 
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factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). “[I]f the district court’s sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it 
unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that 
particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” Id.  
Here, we conclude that Marcoccia’s 96-month sentence—which was 55-months 
lower than the bottom end of his properly calculated advisory guidelines range—was 
substantively reasonable. First, the District Court appropriately considered all the factors 
present in § 3553(a), including: (1) “the seriousness of the offense”; (2) the need “to 
afford adequate deterrence”; (3) “promot[ion of] respect for the law”; (4) “the need to 
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar conduct”; (5) “the history and characteristics of the 
defendant”; and (6) policies prescribed by the sentencing commission. 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(1)-(7); J.A. 104-08.  
Second, “[t]he record makes clear that the sentencing judge listened to each 
argument” and “considered the supporting evidence,”7 and this Court cannot find that the 
District Court abused its discretion in finding those arguments insufficient to warrant a 
lower sentence. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358 (2007). While Marcoccia may 
not have been directly involved in distributing drugs, the District Court did not err in 
finding the nature of this offense serious when he was integrally involved in this scheme 
                                              
7 Indeed, the District Court agreed with many of Marcoccia’s arguments when it 
decided to grant a substantial downward variance. J.A. 105-08. 
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for two years, funded drug purchases, and made a series of structured deposits to conceal 
the drug proceeds. Likewise, while there is a disparity among the sentences in this case, it 
was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to conclude that the disparity that 
ultimately resulted was warranted based on Marcoccia’s career offender status and five 
prior convictions—four of which related to the possession, distribution, and manufacture 
of methamphetamines.8 
Finally, the District Court did not ignore Marcoccia’s arguments that the career 
offender enhancement had a draconian effect on his sentence—instead it granted a 
substantial variance to ensure that Marcoccia’s sentence appropriately balanced the 
considerations specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Where we could have applied a 
presumption of reasonableness had the District Court handed down a much higher 
sentence that fell within his Guidelines range, see Rita, 551 U.S. at 347, Marcoccia 
simply has not met his burden to demonstrate that the District Court acted unreasonably 
by imposing only a 55-month downward variance.  
                                              
8 On this issue, we note that the District Court incorrectly stated that “[i]f Mr. 
Marcoccia had not been designated a career offender, he would have . . . an offense level 
of 29 and range of imprisonment of between 140 and 175 months.” J.A. 106. Marcoccia, 
has never claimed this was an error, but we are satisfied that, even were we to rule that 
this statement constitutes procedural error, it was harmless. The record shows that the 
District Court did not rely on that range to assess what sentence was appropriate—it 
merely mentioned it to support its point that “there must be some disparity between the 
two co-conspirators, as clearly Mr. Marcoccia has a greater criminal history with or 
without the career offender status.” J.A. 106. In addition, given the substantial downward 
variance and the District Court’s agreement that Marcoccia’s guideline range was too 
high, we believe this to be one of those cases where “a district court may choose to 
disregard the Guidelines as too severe in such a way that we can be certain that the 
miscalculation had no effect on the sentence imposed.” Langford, 516 F.3d at 218. 
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IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm. 
1 
 
United States v. Marcoccia, No. 16-2781 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
 
 I fully agree with the Majority that the District Court properly imposed the career 
offender enhancement in this case, given the directive of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) that 
prior sentences be counted as separate unless there was no intervening arrest and “the 
sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same charging instrument[,] or . . . were 
imposed on the same day.”  Here, as the Majority notes, the record reflects that Appellant 
did have an intervening arrest between his two convictions and thus appears to qualify as 
a career offender on that ground alone.  Maj. Op. 6 n.3.  But, as the Majority also 
explains as its primary ground for affirming, even if Appellant’s sentences were not 
separated by an intervening arrest, the plain language of § 4A1.2(a)(2) provides that state 
and federal sentences are counted separately when they result from convictions charged 
in separate indictments and sentenced on separate days—even when those convictions are 
based on the very same conduct that happened to be charged by separate sovereigns.  
Maj. Op. 6.  I write separately to highlight the concerns raised by the application of 
§ 4A1.2(a)(2) in that situation—an application that may not have been specifically 
intended by the Sentencing Commission and that creates significant tension with other 
aspects of the Guidelines.   
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By way of background, while the plain text of § 4A1.2(a)(2) now provides—as 
acknowledged even by Amicus from whom we invited briefing1—that state and federal 
sentences arising from the same criminal conduct count as separate convictions towards 
career offender status, that was not always so.  Prior to the November 2007 Amendment 
to the Guidelines, such sentences would have been counted as a single sentence because 
they would have been deemed “related” sentences, i.e., sentences that, with no 
intervening arrest, “resulted from offenses that (A) occurred on the same occasion, (B) 
were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (C) were consolidated for trial or 
sentencing.”  U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 comment. n.3 (2006).  But such determinations ultimately 
proved “too complex” and confusing, causing “a significant amount of litigation . . . 
concerning application of the rules,” and “circuit conflicts . . . over the meaning of terms 
in the commentary that define when prior sentences may be considered ‘related.’”2  
U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, Amend. 709, at 238 (Nov. 2007).  Thus, in 2007, the 
Commission amended the Guidelines to eliminate the “related” sentencing provision and 
to instruct that all prior sentences are considered separate unless there was no intervening 
arrest and “the sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same charging 
instrument[,] or . . . were imposed on the same day.”  U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) (2007).   
                                              
1 See Amicus Letter Br. 3.  I join the Majority in extending sincere gratitude to 
Assistant Federal Public Defender Ronald A. Krauss, who, in a tight timeframe, 
submitted a thoughtful and helpful response to the Court’s request for assistance.   
 
 2For example, there was circuit tension over whether, to consider prior 
convictions that were consolidated for sentencing as “related,” courts should require that 
the record include a formal order of consolidation, see, e.g., United States v. Correa, 114 
F.3d 314, 317 (1st Cir. 1997), or not, see, e.g., United States v. Huskey, 137 F.3d 283, 
288 (5th Cir. 1998).   
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The purpose of this Amendment, as explained by the Commission, was to 
“simplif[y] the rules for counting multiple prior sentences and promot[e] consistency in 
the application of the guideline.”  U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C, Amend. 709, at 238.  And 
simplify, it did.  But, in so doing, it also may have swept within its ambit certain 
sentences that the Commission did not specifically consider and, on reflection, would not 
treat as separate sentences.  That is, neither the Amendment nor the Comments to the 
Amendment reflect that the Commission expressly considered that where the same 
misconduct happens to be charged by both state and federal authorities, it typically will 
be charged in different instruments and sentenced on different days; in other words, in 
that circumstance and absent an intervening arrest, the same criminal act invariably will 
be counted under § 4A1.2(a)(2), as amended, as two separate sentences for purposes of 
computing § 4B1.1’s career offender enhancement.   
Given the profound increase in sentence that follows from that enhancement, this 
result is a troubling one, and to the extent the Commission did not consider how 
§ 4A1.2(a)(2) would apply in this circumstance, it may wish to do so for three reasons.   
First, counting these sentences separately appears to conflict with Congress’s 
mandate that the Commission “provid[e] certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of 
sentencing, [and] avoid[ ] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 991(b)(1)(B).  It is also in tension with the Commission’s own Policy Statement that it 
will seek “reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in 
sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders” and 
4 
 
“proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately different 
sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity.”  U.S.S.G. § 1A1.1, p.s.  
True, those goals may be achieved to some extent through departures in a typical 
case, but in career offender cases, the Guidelines limit departure to a single criminal 
history category and thus can have only a small effect on the sentence.  See U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.3(b)(3)(A).  True, too, that district courts also have discretion to grant variances 
when a case falls “outside the heartland to which the Commission intends individual 
Guidelines to apply,” Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted), and they do not abuse their discretion when they 
grant a variance, as the District Court did here, based on a determination that a sentence 
is “greater than necessary in light of the purposes set forth in § 3553(a),” id. at 110 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  But, again, the availability of a variance is no 
panacea, for the Guidelines remain “in a real sense the basis for the sentence,” Peugh v. 
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (2013) (emphasis omitted), and sentencing courts 
must still look to them as “the starting point and the initial benchmark,” Gall v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).   
Unquestionably, and with dramatic effect, the determination “whether or not a 
defendant is designated a career offender . . . will shift the ‘benchmark’ or ‘framework’ 
of the district court’s sentencing determination by changing the recommended sentencing 
range.”  United States v. Calabretta, 831 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2016).  And when that 
benchmark or framework is shifted by catapulting to career offender status a defendant 
who previously engaged in the very same conduct as others, but happens to have been 
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charged and sentenced for that conduct by both federal and state authorities, the 
consequences for the defendant being sentenced are palpable, with the Guidelines 
contributing to the very harm they are meant to prevent—disproportionality and disparity 
in sentencing.3   
Second, it is not apparent how the goal of the career offender enhancement is 
served by counting as separate sentences a federal and a state sentence that stem from the 
same criminal conduct.  The career offender enhancement was meant to address 
recidivism, with Congress directing the Commission to “assure that the guidelines specify 
a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized” for 
defendants who, at the time of sentencing, “ha[ve] previously been convicted of two or 
more prior felonies.”  28 U.S.C. § 994(h).  The Commission responded with § 4B1.1, 
imposing a significant career offender enhancement on three-strike defendants and 
explicitly focusing on “the class of recidivist offenders for whom a lengthy term of 
imprisonment is appropriate,” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 comment. background, and whose 
“[r]epeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited likelihood of successful 
rehabilitation,” U.S.S.G. Ch.4, Pt.A, intro. comment.  But where two of those three 
strikes arise from the very same criminal conduct, application of the enhancement does 
not accurately reflect Congress’s or the Commission’s considered decision to impose a 
                                              
3 As Amicus astutely observes, the Department of Justice’s Petite policy, which 
generally advises against a federal prosecution for the same acts already prosecuted at the 
state level is likewise insufficient to dispel these concerns as, in some cases, the federal 
sentence will be imposed before the state sentence, and, in any event, “the Government 
has reserved the right to apply or not apply its ‘policy’ in its discretion.”  Petite v. United 
States, 361 U.S. 529, 533 (1960) (Brennan J., concurring).   
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sentence at or near the maximum authorized only on those offenders who have engaged 
in three or more felonies.  Instead, it allows the draconian effect of § 4B1.1 to reach even 
two-time offenders, in effect, redefining career offender status.    
Third, treating these sentences as separate also has implications for the reality and 
the appearance of fundamental fairness in sentencing.  While an offender “has no 
substantive right to a particular sentence,” the Supreme Court has recognized that the 
“procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence” does implicate due process 
concerns.  Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977); see Townsend v. Burke, 334 
U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (recognizing due process concerns inherent in sentencing based on 
false criminal history).  And those concerns are triggered where the serendipity of two 
sovereigns charging and sentencing the same conduct on different days results in the 
mandatory application of the career offender enhancement under the Guidelines, which 
then serve as the “benchmark” and “framework” for sentencing.  Gall, 552 U.S. at 49; 
Calabretta 831 F.3d at 135.  Marcoccia, absent his intervening arrest, would have 
presented a case in point:  Without the enhancement, his Guidelines range would have 
been 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment (based on an offense level of twelve and a Criminal 
History Category of V) see Maj. Op. 4 n.2; with it, his range was 151 to 188 months’ 
imprisonment (based on an offense level of twenty-nine and a Criminal History Category 
of VI), see J.A. 87.   
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With the frequency of joint and parallel federal-state investigations,4 there are sure 
to be future cases that will present the issue squarely and will require sentencing courts to 
consider carefully the effect of § 4A1.2(a)(2) and the extent of any variance that may be 
appropriate to ensure the sentence imposed reflects the considerations specified in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) and avoids disproportionality and unwarranted disparity in sentencing.  
Accordingly, if the Sentencing Commission did not intend the 2007 Amendment to 
§ 4A1.2(a)(2) to cover this situation, I urge it to provide further guidance at the earliest 
opportunity.   
                                              
4  See, e.g., Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, Exec. Office of the President, 
Nat’l Drug Control Strategy 37 (2016) (explaining that “[m]ulti-jurisdictional task force 
teams that implement strategies to pool resources and share information are the backbone 
of counterdrug enforcement efforts”). 
